


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
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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE  
RELATING TO NATIONAL SECURITY

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State Dept. review completed

GROUP 1  
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

C O N T E N T S

1. Vietnam: Current situation report. (Page 1)
2. Kashmir: Conflict becoming prolonged and possibly more intensive. (Page 3)
3. Tanzania: Dar es Salaam having second thoughts about support for Congo rebels and other dissident Africans. (Page 4)
4. Notes: Communist China - Singapore; Ecuador; Egypt-USSR; [REDACTED]

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## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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\*Vietnam: (Information as of 4:30 AM EDT)

Military Situation in South Vietnam: The planned phases of the major US Marine operation in coastal Quang Ngai Province south of Chu Lai Air Base have been successfully completed, although mopping-up activity is continuing.


Marines yesterday pushed through to objectives on the beach, where a remaining pocket of Viet Cong troops had been reported. One Marine battalion, which suffered the greatest casualties, is being withdrawn from the area, while the remaining two, possibly joined by two Vietnamese battalions, sweep the operational area to mop up Viet Cong troops who may remain in tunnels or have been bypassed.

US casualties now total 52 killed, 205 wounded, and two missing. Preliminary estimates of Viet Cong losses indicate that more than 560 have been killed and several hundred wounded; a complete and accurate count is still not available, however. Eighty-two Viet Cong have been captured. Press reports quote Marine personnel as saying that part of the Viet Cong force may have escaped during the night of 18-19 August, either by pushing out to sea or by infiltrating through rear positions.

The Viet Cong force engaged during the two-day battle included four battalions of the 1st Viet Cong Main Force Regiment, a total of about 2,000 men.

No further reports have been received concerning the situation at Dak Sut in Kontum Province, where a Special Forces camp and district headquarters were

# NORTH VIETNAM



overrun by an estimated Viet Cong battalion late on 18 August. The fate of one US Special Forces adviser believed in the area and three Vietnamese paramilitary companies is still unknown.


Communist Military Developments: Preliminary field analysis of low-altitude photographs taken on 16 August reveals the presence of what may be a new surface-to-air missile site or SAM-associated facility near Kep about 33 miles northeast of Hanoi. The equipment thus far tentatively identified in photography includes two canvas covered launchers, an electronics van, two probable computer/generator vans, a possible propellant fuel vehicle, and three tents about 50 feet long which could house SA-2 missiles. Several anti-aircraft artillery sites are nearby.

A number of suspect electronics areas were also observed southeast of Kep. Several of the revetments appear to be camouflaged and there is evidence of attempts to conceal vehicular activity in the area. Kep lies on the important rail line running northeast from Hanoi to the Chinese border. It is also the site of an airfield that is being lengthened and equipped with parking revetments suitable for jet aircraft.

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Kashmir: [The conflict threatens to become a prolonged and possibly more intensive struggle.]

[The Indians now estimate the number of infiltrators at more than 4,000 and an Indian Foreign Ministry official assesses the continuing flow at several hundred per night. A bounty has been offered for the capture of guerrillas in an effort to stimulate the support of the local Kashmiri populace. There seems little doubt now that the Indian press is exaggerating the degree of success Indian forces are having in coping with the wide-ranging guerrilla bands.]

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[In recent days, however, the guerrillas seem to be having less success in at least one area because they are allowing themselves to be engaged in pitched battles with superior Indian forces. Possibly as a result, conventional military activity appears to be on the rise along the cease-fire line.]

[Pakistan has apparently retaliated for India's move against Pakistani posts in the Kargil area by capturing a number of Indian posts at the southern end of the line. Two locally recruited infantry battalions officered by Pakistanis are reported to have crossed the cease-fire line in the Poonch area, and a regular Pakistan Army battalion is reported to have moved up to the line nearby. An artillery attack on an Indian brigade headquarters near Jammu has reportedly resulted in the death of the brigadier commanding.]

[Indian officials in New Delhi continue to claim that they are willing to use the UN mechanism for an alleviation of the situation, but the effectiveness of the UN observers on the scene is being reduced by suspicion among the military on both sides as to the observers' impartiality.]

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Tanzania: [Dar es Salaam is having second thoughts about its militant support for the Congo rebels and other dissident Africans.]

[Foreign Minister Kambona informed the OAU's African Liberation Committee (ALC) headquarters in Dar es Salaam last week that his government wants the ALC moved out of Tanzania. He said that Tanzania has shouldered long enough the collective responsibility for the OAU liberation effort without receiving the promised financial contributions from member states. He added that the ALC's arms stockpile was creating a storage problem and a potential security threat in Tanzania.]

[Any ALC transfer would have to be decided by the OAU. Zambia, the most logical alternative site, has already expressed its lack of enthusiasm.]

[There have been several unconfirmed reports that Dar es Salaam has cut off funds and food to the Congo rebels in Tanzania in an effort to force their departure. However, many rebels are unwilling to abandon the good life there to fight in the eastern Congo.]

[The Tanzanians, who are fed up with the feuding rebel leadership, fear that the rebels will begin selling their weapons within Tanzania. They also realize that Tanzania stands alone in Africa in backing a losing cause.]

[President Nyerere and Kambona are now concerned that their external diversions are draining the country's resources and have had a serious adverse effect on Tanzanian relations with various countries, both African and Western.]

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NOTES

Communist China - Singapore: Peiping is cautiously seeking to establish friendly relations with Singapore but has not yet commented publicly on the new state. The Singapore Government has received a congratulatory letter from Chinese Foreign Minister Chen Yi expressing hope for friendship between the two countries but implying that Taipei's recognition of Singapore might create difficulties. Neither Singapore nor Peiping has so far publicly mentioned this letter, but the Chinese radio has broadcast a statement from the chairman of the Bank of China applauding Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew's decision to permit continued operation of the bank's Singapore branch.

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Ecuador: Guayaquil merchants have again closed most business establishments in a commercial strike against tariff reform. A similar endeavor failed in May, but with the ruling military junta weakened by the July political crisis, the merchants might succeed this time in wringing humiliating concessions from it. Student and labor organizations,

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have decided to join the strike. Subversives and political intriguers, however, have not yet moved to exploit what is essentially a pressure group challenge to the government's authority to regulate the economy.

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Egypt-USSR: President Nasir's visit to Moscow on 27 August - 1 September will probably be directed largely toward general discussions and the establishment of personal relations with the present Soviet leadership. There is no indication that Nasir expects to receive or that the Soviets plan to offer any significant increase in the extensive economic and military aid Egypt is already receiving.

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## NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

The United States Intelligence Board on 19 August 1965 approved the following national intelligence estimates:

Memorandum to Holders of NIE 11-10-65:  
"Soviet Capabilities and Intentions with Respect  
to Chemical Warfare" [REDACTED]

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NIE 85-65, "Situation and Prospects in Cuba"

[REDACTED]

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THE PRESIDENT

The Vice President

Executive Offices of the White House

Special Counsel to the President

The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

The Scientific Adviser to the President

The Director of the Budget

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Under Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)

The Assistant Secretary of Defense

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

Commander in Chief, Atlantic

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

The Director, The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

The Department of Justice

The Attorney General

The Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

National Aeronautics and Space Administration

The Administrator

The Atomic Energy Commission

The Chairman

The National Security Agency

The Director

The United States Information Agency

The Director

The National Indications Center

The Director

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